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Abstract
Trust and reciprocity facilitate cooperation and are relevant to virtually all human interactions. They are typically studied
using trust games: one subject gives (entrusts) money to another subject, which may return some of the proceeds
(reciprocate). Currently, however, it is unclear whether trust and reciprocity in monetary transactions are similar in other
settings, such as physical effort. Trust and reciprocity of physical effort are important as many everyday decisions imply an
exchange of physical effort, and such exchange is central to labor relations. Here we studied a trust game based on physical
effort and compared the results with those of a computationally equivalent monetary trust game. We found no significant
difference between effort and money conditions in both the amount trusted and the quantity reciprocated. Moreover, there
is a high positive correlation in subjects’ behavior across conditions. This suggests that trust and reciprocity may be
character traits: subjects that are trustful/trustworthy in monetary settings behave similarly during exchanges of physical
effort. Our results validate the use of trust games to study exchanges in physical effort and to characterize inter-subject
differences in trust and reciprocity, and also suggest a new behavioral paradigm to study these differences.
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Introduction
Trust exists to some degree in all human interaction and is
associated with a more healthy, egalitarian and productive society
[1,2,3]. It can be defined as a positive expectation in the face of
uncertainty emerging from social relations [4,5]. Trust enables
cooperative behavior, facilitates organization in both permanent
and temporary work groups and is associated with higher job
satisfaction, lower labor cost and larger profits [3,5,6,7]. It can be
seen in diverse types of interactions: people trust money to
bankers, hoping that they won’t run away with it; they trust their
own home, letting complete strangers stay in their house and they
also trust physical effort, for example by helping a friend move
[4,8]. Across such situations trust plays different roles and it seems
important to understand commonalities and differences.
Trust is often justified as humans express reciprocity: they return
helpful or harmful acts in kind, even though such behavior may
come at a cost [9,10]. As in trust, reciprocity is also expressed in
different situations: in the examples above, the banker will work
harder to maximize the earnings of the trustful investor, and a
person that just stayed for free in someone else’s house will more
likely consider hosting as well [8]. If two people interact repeatedly,
then not reciprocating but exploiting the partner has to be weighted
against the cost of losing collaboration in the future [10,11]. If,
however, partners only interact once, then there is no direct risk of
such retaliation. Nevertheless, even in one-shot interactions humans
tend toreciprocate,whilethisbehaviorismuchmoredifficulttofind
in other species [10]. Reciprocity in single encounters is of special
interest for economists since in the current global market the
traditional long-term repeated interactions between relatives or
neighbors are being slowly replaced by one-time interactions
between anonymous partners [10]. A better understanding of
reciprocity in one-shot interactions in all its different contexts can
then be of particular relevance to the current economy.
The importance of trust and reciprocity has been progressively
recognized in the field of labor economics. Trust increases the
ability of group members to work together [12] and promotes
reciprocity [13]. It also seems to affect effort. For example,
intensive control by a supervisor may lead to decreased work effort
because it is sensed as an indication of distrust [14,15].
Furthermore, trust within a group seems to affect their work
effort, although the relationship between trust and effort is not very
clear [16]. Some studies suggest that higher levels of trust can
increase effort and efficiency towards the group task [12,17].
Paradoxically, it has also been proposed that in some situations
people with low trust will actually work harder when in a group, in
order to compensate for the putative low performance of the co-
workers [18]. Reciprocity, by its turn, not only reinforces trust but
it can also increase employees working effort, functioning as an
effective contract-enforcement device [19,20]. These studies thus
indicate that trust and reciprocity can affect effort, but how do
they relate is still unclear.
In the context of behavioral economics, trust and reciprocity are
often studied using trust games [2,21,22]. In such a game, one
individual (the trustor) receives a given amount of money, and can
choose how much of it to trust or invest. The trusted amount is
then multiplied by some factor, for example three (symbolizing a
return on social investment), and given to the other player (the
trustee). The trustee can then decide how much of the proceeds to
keep and how much to return to the trustor. The amount of
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amount repaid back by the trustee is a measure of reciprocity. In
this way, trust games allow quantifying both the degree of trust as
well as the degree of reciprocity.
Several studies have used trust games and the results have been
contrary to what would be expected under the assumption of
purely self-interested individuals, who act in order to maximize
their own payoff [9]. In fact, if the trust game is played only once,
then the optimal strategy of a purely self-interested trustee is to not
reciprocate any money, and so the trustor, anticipating this, would
invest nothing [2,23]. Thus, for a one-shot trust game, the Nash
equilibrium (the solution in which no player can increase their
payoff unilaterally) is to neither trust nor reciprocate. Instead, it
has been found that people do trust and reciprocate even at a cost
to their gains [2,21,24]. However, these results were generally
obtained using exchanges of money, and how this ‘‘monetary trust
and reciprocity’’ can extrapolate to other contexts, such as effort, is
still largely unknown [25].
Trust and reciprocity of effort may have different properties
when compared to trust and reciprocity of money. Studies have
suggested that trading effort instead of money can lead to different
results, as it might increase the amount of cooperation [26] and
can affect property rights [27]. Even in daily life this might be
seen. For example, many people would easily give a day’s worth of
work to help a friend to move, but would not so easily offer them
an equivalent amount of money [26]. There are thus indications
that people are willing to entrust effort more than money. If trust
and reciprocity differ between exchanges of money and effort,
then caution is necessary when generalizing the results of the
monetary trust games to the domain of effort.
In this study, we wanted to know how people trust and
reciprocate effort in the context of a trust game. Specifically, we
focused on physical effort, as it can be readily measured. Each of
our 60 subjects participated in two computationally equivalent
trust games, one involving physical effort and one involving
money. We found that there were no significant differences in
trust and reciprocity between effort and monetary conditions.
These results hold even if we analyze only the first game of each
subject. We also found that, across the two conditions, trust and
reciprocity were strongly correlated. Finally, we observed that,
although on average subjects reciprocated identically in both
effort and monetary conditions, there was a much higher
variability in the proportion reciprocated for the effort condition.
Results
In this study we asked if trust and reciprocity differ between
equivalent monetary and effort conditions of the trust game (see
Fig. 1). In one condition subjects traded money (in units of US$)
and in the other they traded effort, which was measured in energy
blocks (EB). We considered the amount sent by the trustor as
absolute trust and the amount sent back by the trustee as absolute
reciprocity, or trustworthiness. We also considered relative trust,
the amount sent by the trustor divided by the total amount
available (in our case, the total amount the trustor had available
was 5 $ or 5 EB) and relative reciprocity, the amount returned by
the trustee divided by the total amount available (i.e. three times
the amount sent by the trustor). Every subject participated in each
condition once, changing partners between conditions. Subjects
kept their role (trustor or trustee) throughout the experiment so
that we could compare how they trusted or reciprocated across
conditions.
We sought to test whether trust differs between monetary and
effort conditions. We found that subjects displayed trusting
behavior in both conditions (Fig. 2A), trusting m$=3.160.3 $ in
the monetary condition and similarly mw=3.160.3 EB in the
effort condition. Both averages were significantly different from
zero, whichis the Nash equilibriumfor this game (p-val$=1.6610
26
and p-valw=1.5610
26, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). No significant
difference in trust was found when comparing the monetary and
effort conditions (p-val=0.96; Wilcoxon signed-rank test; n=30).
Comparing the distribution functions (see Fig. 2B) also no difference
can be found (p-val=1, two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).
This lack of difference between trust in the monetary and effort
conditions surprised us, as we had expected subjects to trust more in
the effort condition of the task.
We wondered if the lack of a statistical difference was due to an
insufficient sample size. We therefore performed a power analysis
asking which effect size we should have detected 90% of the time,
at a a=.05 level of significance. We found that with the variance
present in the data and the number of subjects used we should
have been able to observe a difference if it had exceeded 15%.
Therefore, a difference between both conditions, if existent, should
be smaller than this value. Trusting behavior in our experiment,
thus, seems very similar between the monetary and the effort
conditions.
We also wanted to know if reciprocating behavior differs
between a monetary and an effort condition. We found that
subjects reciprocated in both conditions (Fig. 3a), returning
m$=4.960.6 $ in the monetary condition and mw=4.860.6 EB
in the effort condition. The averages were again significantly
different from zero, the Nash equilibrium (p-val$=1.6610
26 and
p-valw=2.5610
26, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). The same is
observed if we look at the relative reciprocity (m$=0.496
0.03$ and mw=0. 5460.05 EB, p-val$=1.5610
26 and
p-valw=2.4610
26, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). No significant
difference in absolute reciprocity was found comparing the
monetary and effort conditions (p-val=0.95; paired t-test).
Comparing relative reciprocity, there might be a trend for
reciprocating more in the effort condition, but the difference is
not significant (p-val=0.27; paired t-test). Looking at the
cumulative distribution functions of monetary versus effort
reciprocity (see Fig. 3B) no significant difference can be found
(p-val=0.76, two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). A power
analysis (as above) gives an upper limit of 14%, so any real
difference, if it exists, should be smaller than that value. These
results indicate that reciprocity does not differ significantly
between the monetary and effort conditions, and in both cases
subjects reciprocated more than predicted by Nash equilibrium.
We wanted to test if, at an individual level, a subject’s behavior
in the monetary condition was correlated to behavior in the
physical effort condition. We designed the experiment so that each
subject participated in one monetary and one effort condition in
random order and thus we can analyze correlations across the
conditions. We found a high positive correlation in subjects’
trusting behavior between the monetary and effort conditions
(r=0.74, p-val,10
25, spearman correlation; see Fig. 4). We also
found a significant but weaker correlation in reciprocating
behavior (r=0.39, p-val=0.032 for absolute reciprocity; r=0.48,
p-val=0.008 for relative reciprocity; spearman correlations,
n=30; see Fig. 4). Thus, subjects’ behavior was positively
correlated between conditions, with subjects that trusted or
reciprocated more in a monetary condition tending to be more
trusting/trustworthy in a physical effort condition.
To better understand how people reciprocate trust, we analyzed
the correlations between subjects’ investment and what they
received back from the trustee. We found significant positive
correlations between the amount subjects trust and what they
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p-val$,10
28) and the effort (rw=0.73, p-valw,10
25) conditions.
The high correlation between trusted and returned amounts can
be expected, since more trust provides more money or energy
blocks that can be returned. However, looking at the correlations
between the relative values (relative trust with relative reciprocity),
they are much weaker in the monetary condition (r$=0.38, p-
val$=0.04), and disappear in the effort condition (rw=20.14, p-
valw=0.45). Thus, subjects give back more if they receive more,
although the relative reciprocity does not appear to depend
strongly on the relative trust.
We also wanted to know how trustor’s behavior in the second
round was correlated to behavior of the trustee in the first round.
We found a strong positive correlation (r=0.73, p-val,10
25,
n=30, spearman correlation) between the absolute amount
received in the first round and what is trusted in the second
round. Thus, as it has been observed before [23], positive
interactions in one round are correlated with cooperative behavior
in the next.
To understand if this correlation is due to a causal influence of
trustee’s behavior in round one on trustor’s behavior in round two,
we constructed a multiple linear regression model in which both
trust and reciprocity in round one are used as predictors of trust in
round two. According to the model’s fit, trust in the first round
influences trust in the second (b=0.58, p-val=0.01), which would
be expected if trusting is a character trait. We found that the
behavior of the trustee in round one, on the other hand, had no
significant influence (b=0.14, p-val=0.22), which would be
expected if trustors take into consideration that they are playing
with two distinct individuals. It appears that subjects begin the
study with a certain level of trust, which is shared between the
monetary and the effort conditions, and that they do not
significantly update that level based on experience during the first
round.
It is possible that the similarity across rounds occurred because
subjects simply decided to behave in the second round in the same
way they did during the first. To rule out this hypothesis we
compared behavior using only the first round of the game. In this
way, every subject only contributes one independent data point
(see Fig. 5). Subjects trusted m$=2.860.4 $ and mw=3.460.5 EB
and reciprocated a total of m$=4.360.8 $ and mw=4.660.8 EB
(values significantly different from zero, p-val=6.1610
25 for all
cases, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n=15). The relative returns
follow the same tendency (m$=0.4760.04 $ and mw=0.5060.06
Figure 1. Experimental setup. A) Representation of the trust game used in this experiment. In each condition the trustor sends some amount I
between 0 and 5 units, units which in the monetary condition (on the left) are US $ and in the effort condition (on the right) are energy blocks (EB).
This amount is then tripled and sent to the trustee, who can then return some quantity R of this tripled amount (3I). In the effort condition both
players have then to do the remaining squats in order to arrive to 20 EB. Each subject plays each condition only once. They keep the same role
throughout the entire experiment but change partners between conditions. B) Example image presented on the computer screen when subjects
were performing the monetary condition part of the experiment. In this phase, the trustor (‘‘player A’’) had just received the 5 $ show-up fee and had
to decide how much to send to the trustee (‘‘player B’’). C) Example image presented on the computer screen when subjects were performing the
effort condition part of the experiment. In this phase, the trustee (‘‘player B’’) was performing squats in order to arrive to 5 EB. While squatting, the
correspondent bar (blue for the trustee, red for the trustor) was going up and the total number of EB possessed by the trustee was shown (as a blue
number next to the trustee’s rectangle). Once the trustee reached the 5 EB threshold the amount given by the trustor would be shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017113.g001
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25). Comparing the monetary and effort
conditions, there was a tendency for higher trust and reciprocity
in the effort condition, but this difference is also non-significant
(p=0.35 for trust and p=0.68 or p=0.69 for absolute and relative
reciprocity; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, n=15). Thus, the observed
similarity across conditions does not seem to be a result of the
repeated nature of the experiment.
To test if there were any gender differences in our results, we
compared male and female behavior in the different conditions.
For both the monetary and the effort conditions, we found no
significant difference between males and females in both the
amount trusted (p-val$=0.45 and p-valw=1; Wilcoxon rank-sum
test; nR=17 and n==13) and the amount reciprocated (p-val$=1
and p-valw=0.54 for absolute reciprocity; p-val$=0.37 and p-
valw=0.58 for relative reciprocity ; Wilcoxon rank-sum test;
nR=18 and n==12). Also, analyzing separately males and
females, we found no differences between behavior in the
monetary and the effort condition, in both the amount trusted
(p-valR=0.17 and p-val==0.45; Wilcoxon signed-rank test) and the
amount reciprocated (p-valR=0.59 and p-val==0.46 for absolute
reciprocity; p-valR=0.41 and p-val==0.38 for relative reciprocity;
Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This lack of gender differences suggests
that the similarity between behavior in the monetary and the effort
conditions does not seem to depend on the person’s gender.
Figure 2. Quantity sent by the trustor, which is considered a
measure of trust. A) Average trust in the monetary and the effort
conditions (black and white, respectively). No significant difference in
trust was found comparing the monetary and effort conditions (p-
val=0.9587; Wilcoxon signed-rank test; n=30). Error bars represent
standard error of the mean (s.e.m.). B) Cumulative distribution function
for the amount sent by the trustor for the monetary (solid line) and the
effort (dashed line) conditions. The distribution functions are not
statistically different (p=1, two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test;
n=30).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017113.g002
Figure 3. Quantity sent back by the trustee, which is
considered a measure of (absolute) reciprocity. A) Average
reciprocity in the monetary and the effort conditions (black and white,
respectively). No significant difference was found comparing the
monetary and effort conditions (p=0.9519; paired t-test; n=30). Error
bars represent s.e.m. B) Cumulative distribution function for the
amount returned by the trustee for the monetary (solid line) and the
effort (dashed line) conditions. The distribution functions are not
statistically different (p=0.76, two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test;
n=30).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017113.g003
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analyzed subjects’ decisions (Fig. 6). We observed more variability
in the strategies employed in the effort condition. For example, in
the effort condition subjects sometimes returned everything or
nothing, neither of which happened in the monetary condition.
In fact, in the monetary condition the vast majority of the trustees
(93%) reciprocated between 1/3 (return exactly what was trusted)
and 2/3 (split total earnings), while in the effort condition this
percentage, although still high, decays to 70%. All trustors sent
something to the trustees, almost all the trustees returned
something, and the vast majority of the trustees (93% in the
monetary, 87% in the effort condition) returned the same or
more than the trustor sent. In several cases, (2 in the effort, 8 in
the monetary condition) the trustor sent the entire show-up fee to
the trustee, and the trustee returned 2/3 of it back – this point
may be considered fair and efficient, since it maximizes the total
money/EB to be shared and it divides it equitably. Most subjects
appear to have followed simple decision-rules in both conditions,
and the strategies employed in the effort condition seem more
variable.
To further analyze if the behavior is indeed more variable in the
effort condition, we computed the dispersion patterns in both
conditions (Fig. 7). Relative reciprocity, although its average does
not differ across conditions (recall Fig. 3), has more variance in the
effort condition. Testing for a difference in the variances gives a
significant p-value (p=0.002, paired-variance test, n=30). A
similar trend can be observed when looking only at the first round
(Fig. 7 B), although the result is not significant (p=0.19, Bartlett’s
variance test, n=15). Thus, when subjects traded effort they
showed a significantly higher variability of relative reciprocity
values.
Discussion
Here we analyzed if trust and reciprocity differ between
monetary and effort conditions. Our original hypothesis, based
on everyday observations, was that subjects in the effort condition
would trust and reciprocate more. However, we found that across
the monetary and the physical condition subjects showed the same
level of trust and reciprocity. Moreover, subjects’ behavior across
conditions was highly correlated. The only significant difference
was in the variability of behavior, with subjects showing a wider
range of relative reciprocity values in the effort condition.
Subjects in both conditions trusted and were trustworthy,
sending on average more than half of their monetary earnings or
accumulated effort to the other player. The levels of trust and
reciprocity observed in the monetary condition are similar to those
Figure 4. Relationship between a subject’s relative trust or
relative reciprocity in the monetary and effort conditions. Each
trustor is represented by a black dot (n=30) and each trustee is
represented by a grey cross (n=30). When dots or crosses overlap a
small number is shown nearby, representing the amount of overlapping
dots (in black) or crosses (in grey). The black solid line represents a
linear regression of the relative amount trusted in the effort condition
as a function of the relative trust in the monetary condition (b=0.71, p-
val=1.6610
26,r
2=0.57). The grey dashed line represents a linear
regression of the relative amount reciprocated in the effort condition as
a function of the relative amount reciprocated in the monetary
condition (b=0.84, p-val=6.9610
23,r
2=0.23).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017113.g004
Figure 5. Trust and reciprocity values using only data from the
first round. A) Average amount sent by the trustor (trust) in the
monetary and the effort conditions (black and white, respectively),
using only data from the first round. No significant difference in trust
was found comparing the monetary and effort conditions (p-val=0.
346; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, n=15). B) Average amount reciprocated
by the trustee in the monetary and the effort conditions (black and
white, respectively), using only data from the first round. No significant
difference was found comparing the monetary and effort conditions
(p=0.68; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, n=15). Error bars represent s.e.m.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017113.g005
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 February 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | e17113Figure 6. Distribution of joint earnings or effort. A) Representation of trustor’s and trustee’s earnings in the monetary condition(figure similar
to the one presented in [21]). Each subject pair/output of a round is represented by a filled dot. When dots overlap a small number is shown near the
dot, representing the amount of overlapping dots. The outer triangle shows the set of possible earning pairs. The lines represent different possible
relative reciprocity values (how much of the tripled amount sent by the trustor the trustee sent back): (1) if the relative return (pr) is equal to zero
(‘‘give back nothing’’ line), it means that the trustee keeps all the money; (2) when pr=1/3, the trustee sends back the exact amount trusted(dashed
line), so the trustor neither wins nor loses. Points that fall to the left of this line indicate that the trustor lost something by trusting, while points at the
right of the line indicate the opposite; (3) if pr=1/2, the trustee decides to split the tripled investment in half (dashdot line); (4) when pr=2/3$, the
trustee splits in half the total earnings, inclusive of show-up fees (dotted line); (5) finally , when pr=1$ the trustee returns the total of the tripled
investment, which is the maximum he can return(‘‘give all back’’ line). Dots more near the line confluence vertex of the triangle indicate that the
trustor showed lower trust, while dots more near the ‘‘trustor gives all’’ line represent high trust by the trustor. A total number of n=30 subject pairs
is represented. B) Analogous figure to the one represented in (A), but in which what is represented is the total effort (number of energy blocks that
each player had to perform throughout the entire experiment). The triangle here is inverted since increasing trusts decreases the total effort
necessary to finish the task (arriving at 20 EB). A total number of n=30 subject pairs is represented.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017113.g006
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[21,28]. Interestingly, these trusting and reciprocity values were
obtained not only when subjects traded money but also when they
traded physical effort, suggesting that people’s tendency to trust
and reciprocate also applies to physical effort decisions.
Previous studies in movement effort decision-making have
found some similarities between the decisions made in effort
contexts and the ones generally made in monetary settings. For
example, in a study in which subjects had to move in order to
receive rewards or avoid punishment [29], subjects displayed
behaviors such as loss aversion and diminishing returns,
phenomena typically described in monetary settings [30]. Here,
we show that this similarity between movement and economic
decisions also extends to social decisions.
Recent research has examined trust and reciprocity in an
experiment in which physical effort was involved [27]. In a one-
shot trust game, subjects had to expend effort, specifically crack
walnuts, in order to receive money, which they could then use in a
trust game. Both trustors and trustees tended to give more money
to subjects that had worked – it is as if the work had resulted in
‘‘property rights’’. In this experiment only money was traded and
the authors focused on how effort affected the interactions in a
trust game, while in our study we asked how the nature of traded
units affects behavior and therefore we could ask if trust and
reciprocity are shared across these domains.
Our results show, even on the individual level, that trust and
reciprocity are very similar between the monetary and the effort
conditions. This can indicate that trust and reciprocity may be
character traits. This idea is supported by previous studies, which
also reported high correlations between cooperative behaviors in a
trust game paradigm (meaning trust and trustworthiness) and
specific personality traits [28,31,32,33]. There has been also some
indication that part of this cooperative behavior in trust games can
be heritable, with monozygotic twins behaving in a more similar
way when compared to dizygotic twins [22]. Our results
contribute to the view that trust and reciprocity are true character
traits.
Why would trust and reciprocity be shared across monetary and
effort conditions? Trust and reciprocity have governed social
interactions over evolutionary timescales, and it was thus suggested
that they could tap into ancient neural systems involved in social
cooperation or even directly into reward pathways [11,23,34,
35,36]. Since cooperation for joint effort is older than monetary
cooperation, we should expect an increased reliance on these
primitive pathways. We thus suggest that the behavioral
correlation observed between monetary and physical effort
conditions may be a result of shared neural substrates. In future
studies, this hypothesis could be tested experimentally using
neuroimaging approaches.
Another interesting future study to perform would be to check
the specific effects of property rights on behavior in the money and
effort conditions. In our experiment, while in the effort condition
people worked to arrive at 5 energy blocks that they then traded,
in the monetary condition people received the $5 as a show up fee
without having to work for it. This created a potential difference in
the property rights people could feel about the trading units.
Surprisingly, this potential difference between conditions did not
result in a measurable difference in behavior. It would be
interesting to test the effects on behavior when property rights
are elicited for the monetary version, for example by having
subjects solve a given number of puzzles in order to get the initial
$5. We hypothesize that this could create an even higher similarity
between behavior in the monetary and the effort conditions.
The only difference we found across the conditions was that
relative reciprocity is more variable in the effort condition. This
difference can be due to a higher variance of fitness levels across
the subject pool compared to variance of average earnings,
although this is unlikely the only cause as this higher variability is
not exhibited in trusting behavior. It is also possible that
reciprocity of effort has less stringent social norms. Given that
money is typically easily quantified and carries very strong
emotional values [37], there can be specific social norms on what
someone should reciprocate monetarily, but these social norms
may be less stringent when it comes to effort retribution. These
Figure 7. Box plots of the relative reciprocity obtained for the
monetary and effort conditions. In A) all data was used (n=30),
while in B) just the data concerning the first experiment made by each
subject was used (n=15). The middle horizontal dashed line represents
the median (50
th percentile), the lower horizontal solid line represents
the minimum; the bottom and top of the box are the percentile 25
th
and 75
th, and the upper horizontal solid line represents the maximum
of the data. Note that when no upper black line can be seen it is
because the 75
th percentile and the maximum are the same.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017113.g007
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pool of participants as well as the social framing of the experiment.
The fact that the behavior in both effort and monetary
conditions was similar and correlated has two major methodolog-
ical implications. First, it validates the use of the typical monetary
trust game as an effective tool to study trust and reciprocity.
Second, it opens the possibility of studying trust and reciprocity
using physical effort tasks. Effort based tasks may have a number
of advantages. One advantage is that such experiments may be
done cheaply over a wide range of investments (from a single squat
to hours of hard workout). Furthermore, it can be a good
alternative when comparing trust games across different countries,
with different monetary units and/or different purchasing power,
as the value of each energy block is less likely to be influenced by
the country from which a person is from. Finally, it can allow for a
better sampling of the population, as it is easier (and probably
cheaper) to get a wider coverage of the population’s physical effort
cost functions than of the monetary cost functions, and can thus
offer us a bigger and more representative set of behaviors. The
physical effort condition that we introduced here may be seen as a
new tool to study trust and reciprocity, complementing the use of
monetary trust games.
Materials and Methods
Participants
A total of 60 healthy volunteers (35 females, 25 males; age
3069 years) participated in the experiment. All experimental
protocols were performed in accordance with federal guidelines
and the Northwestern University’s policy statement on the use of
humans in experiments. Informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
Experimental procedure
Each experimental session consisted of a trust game presented
in 2 conditions, monetary and physical effort. All subjects in the
same session experienced the same sequence of events. The
choice to start with the effort or the monetary condition was
pseudorandom, so that half of the volunteers started with one
condition, and the other half started with the other, to avoid any
potential priming effects. Each subject played both conditions of
the trust game once. Subjects were randomly assigned to be
either player A (trustor) or player B (trustee) and kept that role
throughout the experimental session. In order to minimize
potential multi-round effects, subjects were randomly matched
for the first condition of the experiment and changed partners
between conditions. Players with the same role were placed in the
same room, and were informed that they would only be playing
with subjects that were in another room. They were instructed to
not discuss strategies with one another. Furthermore, they were
also informed that the person with whom they were playing
would change between experiments. Subjects were given no
information that enabled them to identify their partner and were
also asked to keep their decisions private. They received written
instructions (see Appendix S1). The instructions and the
computer screen were phrased as neutral as possible; words like
‘‘trust’’, ‘‘cooperation’’, ‘‘competition’’ and ‘‘opponent’’ were
avoided. An experimental session (including instructions, both
experiments and waiting time) averaged 60 minutes. Earnings
averaged $18 and ranged between $14 and $25.
The Game
In the monetary condition, both player A (trustor) and player B
(trustee) received 5 US dollars ($5) as a show-up fee. Player A then
decided to send all, none or some (in multiples of $0.25) of the
show-up fee to player B. The amount sent to player B was tripled.
Player B then decided how much of that money to send back to
player A and how much to keep (see Fig. 1 A). In the effort condition,
both player A and player B had to perform squats while standing
on a 4-sensor force-plate until each of them reached 20 ‘‘energy
blocks’’ (EB). Initially both player A and player B had to perform
squats until a total of 5 energy blocks was reached. Player A then
had the opportunity of sending a portion of the 5 energy blocks (in
multiples of 0.25) to player B. The amount of energy blocks sent to
player B was tripled. Player B then decided how many energy
blocks to return to player A (see Fig. 1 A). Each player had then to
perform the remaining squats in order to reach the 20 energy
blocks required for the task. Each player received $10 for
completing this part of the experiment.
Data acquisition
Participants wrote their decisions in a box on a computer
screen. At each point of time, the computer screen showed two
rectangles, one at the left side of the screen with the amount of
dollars/energy blocks possessed by player A (trustor) and one at
the right side with the amount of dollars/energy blocks possessed
by player B (trustee). Furthermore, a color-code was given: red for
the dollars/energy blocks earned by the trustor and blue for the
ones earned by the trustee (see Fig. 1 B and C). Subjects’ responses
were recorded using Matlab. For the effort experiment, data was
collected using a 4-sensor force-plate (Nintendo Wii
TM Balance
Board, recorded at 500 Hz). By performing squatting movements
with their body, subjects produced forces, which were then
translated to Energy Blocks.
An energy block (EB) is a multiple of the work produced by that
subject (W) per unit of mass (m):
EB~c
Wt
m
Where c is a constant, in this case c=1/4. Work was defined at
each point of time t based on the forces recorded via:
Wt~
X t
i~0
Fi jj vi jj Dti
Where Fi is the average force obtained by the 4-sensor force plate
(in Newtons) at each iteration i, vi is the velocity and Dti is the
amount of time that passed between i-1 and i (which was, on
average, about 0.035 s).
Supporting Information
Appendix S1 Instructions for participants.
(DOC)
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